Synopsis

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
1985

This synopsis highghts significant legal developments which occurred in the field of immigration in 1985. Although the Supreme
Court decided only two cases concerning immigration law, the
lower federal courts were highly active, especially with respect to
issues evolving from illegal immigration. In 1985, increasingpubover such issues as the sanctuary
lic debate in the United States

movement and the need for major immigration reform legislation
evidenced the present lack of consensus as to the political, social,

and economic effects which result from the flow of undocumented
immigrants into this country.
INTRODUCTION

In 19851 over 1.3 million undocumented aliens were apprehended
in the United States.2 This figure represents an eleven percent increase over last year's record.' Not surprisingly, issues involving illegal immigration dominated judicial and legislative activity in the
field of immigration law.
United States immigration law and policy remain largely undeveloped; consequently, formulation of this law and policy often evokes
fundamental questions concerning constitutional interpretation,
moral and political philosophy, international law, and public law and
1. fiscal year.
2. See Federation for American Immigration Reform, IMMIGRATION REPORT,
November 1985, at 1.
3. Id. INS Commissioner Alan Nelson estimates that only "one out of two"
aliens who cross the border are ever caught. Id.
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administration. Court activity, public debate over the status of El

Salvadorans in the United States, and the sanctuary movement are
but a few specific illustrations of the divergence of views on these
questions. This lack of consensus also produced conflict in the legislative arena as Congress again tackled the issue of whether and how
to stem the ever-increasing flow of illegal immigration.
The Supreme Court decided only two immigration cases in 1985.
These cases presented issues concerning eligibility for suspension of
deportation and the detention and denial of parole to refugees. In the

lower courts, asylum issues continued to dominate immigration litigation with particular attention focusing on the appropriate standards of proof for asylum and withholding of deportation claimants.
Additionally, federal courts addressed the fate of the excludable Cuban "Marielitos" and further delineated fourth amendment rights.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

In 1985, Supreme Court activity in the field of immigration declined sharply, with the Court deciding just two immigration cases,
INS v. Rios-Pineda and Jean v. Nelson,5 on the merits. The Court
denied review in six other cases.6
4. 105 S. Ct. 2098 (1985).
5. 105 S. Ct. 2982 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Jean III].
6. In Robinson v. Mississippi, 443 So. 2d 850 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 775 (1985), the Court declined to review affirmance by the Supreme Court of Mississippi of a trial court's decision that land purchased by a nonresident alien in bad faith for
use in a drug smuggling operation should escheat to the state, notwithstanding the treaty
between the United States and Great Britain containing a "most favored nation" clause.
In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1354 (1985), the Court denied review of dismissal by a court of appeals, for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, of a complaint by survivors and legal representatives of
persons killed in Israel against the Libyan Arab Republic and various Arab organizations. The claimants had sued in the district court, alleging violations of law of nations,
treaties of the United States, and criminal and common law of the United States.
The Court denied review in both Reyes v. INS, 747 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2173 (1985), and Young v. United States Dep't of Justice, 759 F.2d
450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 412 (1985). Both petitions sought clarification of
the standard of proof applicable to asylum and withholding of deportation applicants.
On October 7, 1985, the opening day of its 1985-1986 term, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Herier-Darcherial v. United States, 762 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 75 (1985), which was an unpublished decision of the Ninth Circuit.
The court of appeals had affirmed the conviction of a man found in the United States
after deportation in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 326 (See
Infra note 7 for full citation). The court found that the petitioner had not proved that
there was a denial of due process in the underlying deportation order. Immigration
judges are not required to notify aliens of either (1) their eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility, or (2) their need for permission to reapply for admission under INA §
212(a)(17). 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 976 (1985).
In Unauthorized Practice Comm., State Bar of Texas v. Cortez, 692 S.W.2d 47
(Tex.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 384 (1985), the Court refused to review the Texas Supreme Court holding that non-lawyers could be enjoined from performing immigration
services which required legal skill and knowledge.
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INS v. Rios-Pineda

Section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)1
allows the Attorney General, in his discretion, to suspend an alien's
deportation if the alien has been continuously present in the United
States for seven years, is of good moral character, and demonstrates
that deportation would result in extreme hardship to the alien or to

the alien's parent, spouse, or child who is a citizen or lawful permanent resident." The Attorney General delegates this discretionary au-

thority to immigration judges9 whose decisions are subject to review
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).10

The respondents in INS V. Rios-Pineda were a Mexican national
couple who illegally entered the United States in 1974.11 Between

the time of their entry and their deportation hearing in December
1978, respondent wife gave birth to a child, a United States citizen.

At the time of their deportation hearing, however, the immigration
judge denied their request for suspension of deportation because they
had not been continuously present in the United States for seven
years. On appeal, the BIA affirmed this ruling."2
In July 1980 the couple filed a petition for review in the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, alleging that: (1) the immigration judge
should have given them Miranda warnings; (2) their deportation was
an unlawful de facto deportation of their citizen child; and (3) re7. Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1982),
originally enacted as Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163 [hereinafter cited as INA], provides:
[t]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust
the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted to permanent residence, in the
case of an alien . . . who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of
deportation and-(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except
the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character; and is a
person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result
in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence ....
8. Id.

9.

8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).

10. See Dill v. INS, 773 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1985).
11. Respondent husband had first entered the United States illegally in 1972. He
was apprehended by the INS, and returned to Mexico in 1974 under threat of deportation. Two months later, he and his wife entered the United States with the aid of a paid
smuggler. Rios-Pineda, 105 S. Ct. at 2100.
12. See id. 105 S. Ct. at 2100-01.

spondent husband had met the continuous presence requirement."3
When the appeal was eventually heard fifteen months later,1 4 both
respondents had accrued the requisite seven years' presence. In light
of this development, the court of appeals remanded the case to the
BIA for consideration of respondents' motion to reopen.' 5 The BIA
denied the motion as a matter of discretion, citing both procedural
and substantive reasons.' 6 The Eighth Circuit
again reversed and or7
dered the BIA to reopen the proceedings.1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to explore the scope of the
Attorney General's discretion in acting on motions to reopen civil
requests for suspension of deportation.18 The Court found the Attorney General's authority in this area to be broad, holding that even
where a motion to reopen demonstrates a prima facie case of eligibility for suspension of deportation, the Attorney General has the discretion to deny the motion. 10 Based upon the facts of this case, the
BIA was justified in denying respondents' motion to reopen for two
separate and adequate reasons.
First, respondents had satisfied the continuous presence requirement only by virtue of their meritless appeals. Neither husband nor
wife had been in the country for seven years when suspension of deportation was initially denied.20 The Court reasoned that the purpose
of an appeal is to correct legal errors which occurred at the initial
determination of deportability, not to delay physical deportation with
the hope of satisfying legal requirements. 2 '
Second, the Court held that the BIA had not abused its discretion
by denying reopening of the proceedings on the basis of respondents'
flagrant immigration law violations.2 2 Respondents had illegally en13. Id. at 2101. The petition for review in the court of appeals automatically
stayed their deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § I105(a)(3) (1982). See id.
14. During the pendency of the appeals, respondent wife gave birth to a second
child. Id. at 2101.
15. The court directed the BIA to allow respondents 60 days to file a motion to
reopen their deportation proceedings and cautioned the BIA to give the motion careful
and thorough consideration. Rios-Pineda v. United States Dep't of Justice, 673 F.2d 225,
228 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1982).
16. The BIA asserted that the motion was not properly filed within 60 days, that
discretionary relief was unwarranted because legal prerequisites were achieved through
meritless appeals, and that flagrant violation of immigration law precluded respondents
from attaining discretionary relief. See Rios-Pineda, 105 S. Ct. at 2101.
17. Rios-Pineda v. United States Dep't of Justice, 720 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1983).
18. See Rios-Pineda, 105 S. Ct. at 2101.
19. Id. at 2102.
20. The Court stated that even prior to its decision in INS v. Phinpathya, 464
U.S. 183 (1984), it was clear that a departure under threat of deportation, coupled with
a subsequent unlawful entry after an absence of two months, would be considered a
meaningful interruption of the seven-year continuous presence period. Rios-Pineda, 105
S. Ct. at 2102 n.2.
21. Rios-Pineda, 105 S.Ct. at 2102.
22. Id. at 2103.
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tered the country repeatedly, utilized the services of a paid smuggler,
and respondent husband had refused to honor his voluntary departure agreement with the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). The Court held that the BIA has the authority to differentiate between degrees of immigration law violations, and could deny a
reopening based upon the respondents' prior conduct.2" By basing its
holding on these particular facts, however, the Court refrained from
establishing a rule that an alien may not be granted suspension of
deportation if he has achieved statutory eligibility pending administrative or judicial review. A lower federal court 24 subsequently cautioned the BIA against labeling legal propositions as frivolous, but
noted that respondents' contentions in Rios-Pineda did offer excellent examples of frivolous arguments. 5
Jean v. Nelson
For almost thirty years prior to 1981, the INS followed a policy of
granting parole to undocumented aliens seeking admission to the
United States.2 6 However, responding to the great influx of Cubans
and Haitians arriving in southern Florida, the INS adopted a new
detention procedure in 1981 at the direction of the Attorney General.2 7 Under this procedure, all immigrants who could not present a
prima facie case for admission would be detained without parole
pending a decision on their admissibility.2 8 This procedure, which
was not based on any new statutory or regulatory authority, 29 became fully operational in southern Florida by July 31, 1982.30
In June 1981 a class action was filed by a group of Haitians who
23. Id.
24. See Dill, 773 F.2d at 25.
25. Id. at 29. The Dill court noted that it was frivolous for aliens to argue that
(1) they were entitled to suspension of deportation when less than seven years had passed
since their first entry into the United States; and (2) a two-month trip abroad under
threat of deportation followed by an illegal clandestine reentry was not "meaningfully
interruptive" of the statutory period. The first argument is squarely contradicted by statute; the second is one on which the law is clear. Id. at 29 n.1.
26. INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982) authorizes the Attorney General, "in his discretion," to parole into the United States any such alien applying

for admission "under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for

reasons deemed strictly in the public interest. . . ." Prior to 1981, the INS had followed
a policy of general parole for undocumented aliens seeking admission to the United
States. See Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2995.
27. See Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2995.

28. Id.
29.

Id.

30. Id.

had been detained and denied parole pursuant to this procedure. 31
The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241,32 and declaratory and injunctive relief. Their complaint alleged two causes of action which ultimately received attention by the
Supreme Court. First, petitioners alleged that the new INS detention
procedure was adopted without adhering to the notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures required by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) .33 Second, they alleged that the parole procedure, as implemented by INS field officers, violated the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment because it discriminated against petitioners on the basis of their race and national origin. 4
The district court concluded that the policy had not been applied
in a discriminatory manner, but ruled that the government had
failed to comply with the requirements of the APA and ordered the
release of the detained class members.35 The court enjoined the INS
from further enforcing the policy of detaining unadmitted aliens until the INS complied with the APA rulemaking procedure. The INS
promptly promulgated a rule within the thirty-day time frame set by
the district court.36 Although the district court found the original
parole policy constitutionally sound, the INS detention/parole rule
was promulgated with facially neutral language to preclude further
equal protection challenge. Both petitioners and respondents agreed
that the new regulation was constitutional on its face, requiring
even-handed and non-discriminatory conduct in parole determinations.37
The INS appealed the district court's decision on the APA claim,
and petitioners cross-appealed the district court's denial of the discrimination claim in Jean v. Nelson38 (Jean 1). An Eleventh Circuit
panel affirmed the ruling of the district court on the APA claim,

31. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
32. According to the statute, writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any Supreme Court Justice, the district courts, and all circuit judges within
their respective jurisdictions. The basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully
incarcerated or restricted by any branch or agency of government to obtain their freedom. See, e.g., Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206 (1969).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-553(e) (1982). An administrative agency generally cannot adopt a substantive rule without first publishing notice of the proposed regulation and
providing interested parties with the opportunity to comment.
34. See Louis, 544 F. Supp. at 998.
35. Id. at 1003-04.
36. See Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2996. The district court imposed a 30 day stay
upon its enjoining order. For the text of the new regulations concerning parole, promulgated during this 30 day period, see 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1985), promulgated at 47 Fed.
Reg. 30,045 (July 9, 1982), amended by 47 Fed. Reg. 46,494 (Oct. 19, 1982).
37. See Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2996.
38. 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted, 714 F.2d 96 (lth Cir. 1983) (en
banc).
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albeit on a somewhat different rationale. 39 On the cross-appeal, the
panel held that the district court erred in holding that plaintiffs (petitioners) had failed to prove that the governmental actions were the
product of discriminatory intent. However, when the INS petition
for rehearing en banc was granted by the Eleventh Circuit, the panel
opinion
was vacated by operation of Eleventh Circuit rules of
40
court.

The en banc court in Jean v. Nelson41 (Jean II) held that the
APA claim had become moot since the INS was no longer detaining
any class members under the policy held invalid by the district court.
All class members who were still incarcerated had either violated the
terms of their parole or had arrived after implementation of the new
regulations. 42 The court then reviewed petitioners' equal protection
claim, holding the fifth amendment inapplicable to unadmitted aliens
for purposes of consideration for parole. Following prior decisions relating to the constitutional rights of non-entrant aliens, such as
Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel. Mezei,43 the court concluded
that high-level members of the executive branch (the President and
Attorney General) are statutorily authorized 44 to discriminate on the
basis of national origin in making parole decisions. On the other
hand, lower-level INS officers are not empowered to discriminate
against particular detainees in violation of facially neutral instructions from their superiors. 45 The newly promulgated regulations required that parole decisions be made without regard to race or national origin. The en banc Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether the remaining detainees had been
discriminated against by lower-level INS officers.46
39. The court concluded that the new policy was not within any of the notice-andcomment rulemaking exceptions of APA § 553. (Administrative Procedure Act, codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982)). Jean I, 711 F.2d at 1483.
40. Jean III, 105 S. Ct. at 2996. See 11TH CIR. R. 26(k).
41. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 962.
43. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). Under the "entry doctrine" fiction, excludable aliens
who are physically present in the United States and who are being detained or paroled
pending their admissibility, are deemed not to have made an "entry" into the United
States. Thus, they are not accorded the extent of constitutional rights enjoyed by dcportable aliens who have "entered."
44. 8 U.S.C. § l182(d)(5)(a) (1982) permits the Executive, in his discretion, to
discriminate on the basis of national origin in making parole decisions. The Eleventh
Circuit (en banc) concluded that any such discrimination concerning parole would not
violate the fifth amendment because of the plenary power of the government to control
the borders of the nation. Jean 11, 727 F.2d at 975.
45. Jean II, 727 F.2d at 978.
46. Id. at 962.

The petitioners argued before the Supreme Court that the statutory remedy fashioned by the court of appeals would permit lowerlevel INS officers to discriminate against class members released on
parole and current detainees. 47 Petitioners argued that the only adequate remedy was a Supreme Court order for declaratory and injunctive relief on the fifth amendment equal protection grounds
prohibiting such discrimination.48 The government asked the Court
to hold that fifth amendment equal protection had no bearing on an
unadmitted alien's request for parole.49
In a six to two decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals remand to the district court on the issue whether lower-level
INS officers were complying with the statutory requirement of nondiscrimination, but held that there was no need to consider the equal
protection issue. Criticizing the court of appeals for having decided
the constitutional question, the Court, citing ample precedent, reemphasized that courts should consider the non-constitutional grounds
for a decision before evaluating any constitutional bases. 50 The
Court further stated:
Had the court in Jean I followed this rule, it would have addressed the
issue involving the immigration statutes and INS regulations first, instead
of after its discussion of the Constitution. Because the current statutes and
regulations provide petitioners with non-discriminatory parole consideration-which is all they seek to obtain by virtue of their constitutional
argu51
ment-there was no need to address the constitutional issue.

The Court concluded that the new statutes and regulations would be
as effective as a constitutional remedy in protecting petitioners from
the conduct they feared. On remand, the Court ordered the district
court to consider whether any aliens were currently detained as a
result of any discriminatory application of the new regulations. 2
Although the Court disapproved of the Eleventh Circuit's consideration of the constitutional issue, the Court did not evaluate the
circuit court's restrictive view of the constitutional rights of non-entrant aliens. Thus, the issue of the constitutional rights of non-entrant aliens remains ripe for judicial review.53
47. Jean II, 105 S. Ct. at 2992.

48.
49.
50.
Bernard,
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 2997.
Id.
Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 n.10 (1983); Gulf Oil v.
452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980)).
Jean 11I, 105 S. Ct. at 2998.
Id. at 2999.
For a discussion of the rights or lack thereof of non-entrant aliens, see Com-

ment, From Mezei to Jean: Toward the Exit of the Entry Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1143 (1985).
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ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION

United States immigration statutes provide two forms of relief to
those aliens physically present in the United States who seek to
avoid deportation based upon their fear of being persecuted in the
country to which they would be deported.54 An alien may apply for a
discretionary grant of asylum pursuant to section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 55 or for withholding of deportation under section 243(h). 56 When a request for asylum is made
pursuant to section 208(a),
it is also treated as a request for relief
57
under section 243(h).
In 1984, in INS v. Stevic, 58 the Supreme Court held that an alien
applying for withholding of deportation bears the burden of showing
a clear probability of persecution if deported. 9 The "clear

probability" standard is a heavy burden, requiring a showing that it
is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution
if deported.6 0 Because the Stevic Court was not presented with a petition for asylum it refrained from defining the "well-founded fear of
persecution" standard applicable to asylum requests. 61 Consequently,
the courts of appeals have given much attention to the issues of
54. See infra notes 55-56.
55. The petitioner is eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum if he can demonstrate that he is a "refugee" within the meaning of § 101(a) of the Refugee Act of 1980.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982), originally enacted as Refugee Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980), codified at INA, §§ 101(a)(42), 207-209, 243(h),
411-414, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-1159, 1243(h), 1521-1524 (1982). This section
defines a refugee as "any person who is ... unable or unwilling to return to, and is

unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion .

. . ."

8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(42)(A). If a petitioner demonstrates a "well-founded fear of persecution," the
Attorney General may discretionarily grant asylum pursuant to INA § 208(a). INA §
208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) provides in pertinent part, "the alien may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that
such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1l01(a)(42)(A) of this title."
56. Section 243(h) of the INA prohibits the Attorney General from deporting or
returning any alien to a country if the Attorney General determines that "such alien's
life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h)(1) (1982).
57. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1985) provides that "asylum requests shall also be considered as requests for withholding exclusion or deportation pursuant to section 243(h) of
the [INA]."
58. 104 S.Ct. 2489 (1984).
59. Id. at 2492.
60. Id. at 2501.
61.

Id.

whether and how the standards of proof for asylum and withholding
of deportation differ.6 2
For example, the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits agree that
the standards of proof under these sections are not the same; while
the standard for withholding of deportation requires that the petitioner demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution" if deported,
asylum applicants are held to the less stringent "well-founded fear of
persecution" standard. 63 However, the nature and amount of evidence necessary to satisfy this more liberal standard remains
unclear. 6 '
In a Ninth Circuit case, Sarvia-Quintanilla v. INS,"5 the petitioner, an El Salvadoran native, had requested political asylum at his
deportation hearing. According to petitioner, he had been indirectly
threatened by a leftist political group with which he had briefly associated. Additionally, the petitioner testified that he feared retaliation
from the government itself since his brother had killed two government workers. The petitioner introduced, as evidence, supporting affidavits of relatives and an attorney. These affidavits and general
newspaper articles were found to lend only indirect support to the
claims of the petitioner.6 8
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the nature and amount of
proof which would satisfy the "clear probability" and "well-founded
fear" standards. Citing its own recent decision in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,67 the court acknowledged that the "clear probability"
standard could be met by the alien's own testimony regarding specific threats against him.68 In such a case, however, there should be
no doubt as to the credibility of the alien, and there must be documentary evidence indicating the seriousness of the threats.6 9
The "well-founded fear" standard, on the other hand, is more liberal than the "clear probability" standard. Although the threshold
under this test is yet undefined, the court viewed the standard as a
partially objective one. Thus, while the state of mind of the alien
should be considered, even a sincere fear of persecution is not adequate to establish an alien's eligibility for political asylum.7 0 There
must always be specific, direct, and credible evidence supporting the
62. See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1986) (No. 85-782), to resolve the issue of
whether and how the standards of proof for asylum and withholding of deportation differ.
63. See infra notes 65-81 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. 767 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1985).
66. Id. at 1394.
67. 749 F.2d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1984).
68. Sarvia-Quintanilla,767 F.2d at 1392 (citing Bolanos, 749 F.2d at 1326).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1394.
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claim of the alien. 7 '
Applying the facts of this case to its analysis, the court concluded
that neither standard had been satisfied. In addition to citing petitioner's lack of credibility, the court noted that the petitioner had
experienced no difficulty obtaining a passport, and that neither the
72
petitioner nor his family had been directly threatened or harmed.
The Seventh Circuit, in Carvajal-Munoz v. INS,7' distinguished
the standards in terms of relative evidentiary burdens. As in the
Ninth Circuit, an alien's own uncorroborated testimony will not satisfy the "clear probability" standard; objective evidence is necessary.714 The uncorroborated testimony of an applicant can suffice to
meet the "well-founded fear" standard. 5 If the testimony of an alien
is uncorroborated, it must be credible, persuasive, and specific, so as
to create an inference that the alien's fear of persecution is wellfounded. 6 While the Sixth Circuit also evaluates the standards sepa77
rately, it has not delineated their specific evidentiary requirements.
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has held that the same standards of proof apply to both these sections. In Sotto v. INS,7 8 a Philippine citizen who was determined to be deportable after overstaying
his business visa, filed applications for asylum and withholding of
deportation. Petitioner claimed he had been interrogated, intimidated, and harassed in the Philippines due to his membership in organizations hostile to the Philippine government. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals evaluated the proof standards relevant to petitioner's applications and found no difference between the "wellfounded fear" standard and the "clear probability" standard.7 9 Since
a request for withholding of deportation is frequently joined with a
request for asylum at deportation proceedings, the court found it appropriate to apply congruent standards.80
The court reviewed the administrative record of Sotto's case after
the determination by both the immigration judge and the BIA that
Sotto had not submitted sufficient evidence to corroborate his fear of
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 573.

75. Id. at 574.
76.
77.
78.
79.
Rejaie v.
80.

Id.
See, e.g., Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1984).
748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 836. By so holding, the court maintained its earlier position adopted in
INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982).
748 F.2d at 836.

persecution. The Third Circuit could not reconcile these findings
with the evidence in Sotto's file. The court was particularly concerned with an affidavit of a former general and Phillipine assemblyman which stated that petitioner had been on a wanted list for his
political activities, that Sotto's father had been tortured for his son's
political activities, and, that in his opinion, Sotto would be arrested,
detained, and tortured if returned to the Philippines."" The court
found the affidavit was important evidence, material to satisfaction
of the proof standard by petitioner, and remanded the case to the
BIA for full assessment of the evidence.
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue of an alien's right to
notice of possible asylum relief at his deportation hearing. In Duran
v. INS, 82 petitioners Leonillo and Shirley Duran sought to reopen
their deportation proceedings on the grounds that: (1) Mr. Duran
had not been informed of his right to asylum and withholding of
deportation, relief he would have otherwise applied for; and (2) Mrs.
Duran had not been informed of her eligibility for suspension
of de83
portation, relief she would have likewise applied for.
Addressing first Mr. Duran's claim, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
conclusion of the immigration judge that INS regulations84 did not
require the immigration judge to notify petitioner of his right to apply for asylum relief since Mr. Duran had specified the country to
which he would be deported.8 5 Notice of the right to asylum is required only where the immigration judge, rather than the alien,
designates the country of deportation.8" The court affirmed the denial of petitioner's motion to reopen, bringing the Ninth Circuit view
on this issue
into accord with holdings in the Fifth and Eighth
7
Circuits.
Turning to Mrs. Duran's claim, the court found that the immigration regulations required the immigration judge to inform an alien of
the right to apply for suspension of deportation when the judge is
presented with evidence indicating eligibility for such relief.8 8 Because it appeared from the record that Mrs. Duran had been contin81. Id. at 836-37.
82. 756 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1985).
83. Id. at 1339.
84. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1985).
85. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1985) states in pertinent part: "The respondent shall be
advised that pursuant to section 243(h) of the [INA] he may apply for temporary withholding of deportation to the country or countries specified by the special inquiry offlcer
." (emphasis added). In addition, under current INS procedures, aliens are informed of their right to petition for asylum if they give any indication of fear of persecution upon being returned. See Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1984).

86.
87.
831, 833
88.

See 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1985).
See, e.g., Ramirez-Osorio, 745 F.2d at 943-44; Minwalla v. INS, 706 F.2d
(8th Cir. 1983).
See 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1985).
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uously present in the United States for seven years, the court remanded her case to the BIA with instructions to restore her to such
status as would enable her to apply for suspension of deportation on
the same terms as an alien who received proper notice at the deportation hearing.89
FOURTH AMENDMENT

In INS v. Delgado,"0 the Supreme Court held that INS "factory
surveys" 91 did not result in an unlawful seizure or detention of the
entire work force. In 1985, however, two lower federal courts enjoined two INS search practices found to violate the fourth
amendment.
In InternationalMolders' and Allied Workers' Local 164 v. Nelson,9 2 the District Court for Northern California enjoined the INS
practice of conducting workplace raids under "warrants of inspection." "Warrants of inspection" are warrants which name one or
more individuals thought to be illegal aliens at a particular location,
but which also allow the INS to apprehend unspecified and unlimited "others" on the premises who may also be undocumented.9 3 In
the present case, eight workplace raids took place under such "warrants of inspection." Of the 192 individuals arrested in these raids,
179 were "others" not identified in the warrants.
The plaintiff class requested a preliminary injunction against
workplace raids of this character on the theory that they violated
fourth amendment and equal protection rights of the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs argued that the warrants were the equivalent of general
warrants, because they failed to describe with requisite particularity
the persons to be seized,
and they authorized searches and seizures
94
absent probable cause.
The INS relied on Blackie's House of Beef v. Castillo,95 where
the validity of a similar warrant was upheld. In that case, the court
89. 756 F.2d at 1342.
90. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
91. In June and September of 1977, the INS entered the Southern California
Davis Pleating Company to determine whether any of the persons employed there were
illegal aliens. While several INS agents positioned themselves near the factory exits,
other agents moved systematically through the factory, questioning employees as to their
citizenship. The "surveys" were conducted pursuant to warrants which did not identify
any particular aliens by name. Id. at 212.
92. 54 U.S.L.W. 2245 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1985).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95.

659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

reasoned that the traditional probable cause standard for criminal
searches and seizures did not apply to INS investigations, which can
be analogized to administrative inspections.9" Further, Congress contemplated a vigorous INS enforcement 97program, the efficacy of
which depends upon broad search powers.
The district judge, however, rejected the analogy of an INS raid
to an administrative inspection. Administrative inspections are
strictly regulated by legislation and are traditionally designed to
monitor industries or working conditions subject to close government
scrutiny.98 Congress has not legislated any such enforcement scheme
for aliens, nor are workplace raids strictly regulated.99 The court also
rejected the defendant's analogizing undocumented aliens with generic contraband, which is subject to seizure even if unnamed in the
warrant. People cannot be equated with items of contraband, and
unlike objects, people enjoy fourth amendment protections. 00
The court concluded that the INS was routinely using "warrants
of inspection" to conduct disruptive dragnet-style questioning and
seizures of large numbers of workers. In suggesting an acceptable
alternative, the court found guidance in Delgado. The court stated:
It is reasonable to require agents, upon their arrival at a workplace, to serve
a warrant identifying only a small number of individuals, and first ask the
owner or manager to immediately produce those individuals identified in the
warrant. The agents can still position themselves at exits and question or
detain any workers attempting to flee. If the owner or manager is unwilling
or unable to produce the suspects, it then becomes reasonable for the agents
to enter and conduct a sweep. Even this sweep, however, must be directed
at finding the named suspects as quickly as possible rather than questioning
all workers. Any questioning that does transpire must resemble the brief,
"consensual encounters" described in INS v. Delgado.0 '

In La Duke v. Nelson, 02 the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court
injunction prohibiting the INS from conducting searches of migrant
farm and ranch housing without a warrant, probable cause, or ar96. Id. at 1218-19.
97. Id.
98. InternationalMolders, 54 U.S.L.W. at 2245.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Court noted in Delgado that it has yet to rule directly on whether
questioning of an individual by a police officer, without more, could constitute a seizure
under the fourth amendment. 466 U.S. at 216. The Court stated, however, that "[unless]
the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one
cannot say that the questioning resulted in detention under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
In Delgado, the Court noted that INS agents approached employees at their work
stations, indentified themselves, and then asked the employees one to three brief questions regarding their citizenship. At no time were the workers prevented from performing
their jobs or moving about the factory. The Delgado Court concluded that these encounters between the employees and INS agents "were classic consensual encounters
rather than Fourth Amendment seizures." Id.
102. 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ticulable suspicion. The record indicated that armed border patrol
agents engaged in the practice of sealing off roads or paths leading
to a housing area, surrounding the residences in emergency vehicles
with flashing lights, and stationing officers at all doors and windows.
The officers then conducted house-to-house searches in the night or
early morning without the consent of the occupants.10 3
Addressing the fourth amendment issue, the court affirmed the
district court's finding that the INS had accomplished an impermissible seizure of the entire unit. 0 The court rejected the INS argument that Delgado precluded a finding that a seizure had occurred.10 5 This case was distinguishable from Delgado because the
searches were made without a warrant, articulable suspicion, or the
consent of the housing owner.1 0 6 Furthermore, these searches differed materially from those in Delgado because they took place in
the home. Farm and ranch housing is not a mere extension of the
workplace and is thus accorded
a greater degree of protection under
10 7
the fourth amendment.

BOND PROCEEDINGS

Pending the determination of deportability, an alien may be held
in custody, released on conditional parole, or released on bond containing conditions prescribed by the Attorney General.10 8 Prior to
1983, the INS had discretionary authority to impose a condition barring an alien from engaging in unauthorized employment.109 In December 1983, however, the INS issued new regulations which made
the imposition of a "no-work" condition mandatory, thus precluding
103. Id. at 1321.
104. Id. at 1327-28.
105. Id. According to Delgado, an encounter is classified as a fourth amendment
seizure "if, in view of all the circumstances, surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 466 U.S. at 215 (quoting United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
106. La Duke, 762 F.2d at 1328.
107. Id. at 1328-29.
108. INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982) provides:
Pending determination of deportability in the case of any alien as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, such alien may, upon warrant of the Attorney
General, be arrested and taken into custody. Any such alien taken into custody
may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and pending such final determination of deportability, (1) be continued in custody; or (2) be released under
bond in the amount of not less than $500 with security approved by the Attorney General, containing such conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe; or (3) be released on conditional parole. . ..
109. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1985).

individualized determinations. 110 One result of this regulation was to
impair the ability of aliens to support themselves and to obtain legal
counsel pending their deportation hearings.
Soon after the new regulation was implemented, it was challenged
in National Center for Immigration Rights v. INS"' (NCIR). The
case arose as a class action brought by a number of nonprofit immigration service organizations, a union affiliate, and sixteen individuals currently in deportation proceedings. Plaintiffs challenged the validity of the regulation under a number of legal theories. Among
these, plaintiffs argued that the regulation: (1) was enacted without
statutory authority; (2) was not reasonably related to the purpose of
assuring a detainee's appearance at future deportation proceedings;
(3) violated fifth amendment due process and equal protection guarantees; and (4) was inconsistent with and superseded by federal
laws.112 Upon motion by plaintiffs, the district court granted an injunction against enforcement of the regulation. The court concluded
that plaintiffs had a fair chance of showing that the regulation was
inconsistent with federal law and that it violated due process guarantees. 113 After weighing the competing interests, the court concluded
that the harm which could result from unemployment was irreparable and outweighed the potential harm to
the government caused by
11 4
a delay in implementing the regulation.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first disposed of the INS two-point
attack on the jurisdiction of the district court. 115 The court declined
to review, de novo, the validity of the regulation, and confirmed the
ruling of the district court that the plaintiffs had a fair chance of
showing that the prohibition of employment pending a deportation
hearing is not reasonably related to the purpose of securing the detainee's presence at the proceeding; thus, the district court had not
abused its discretion by granting the injunction. 16
110. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6(a)(2)(ii)-(iii), 109.1(b)(8) (1985), which provide in
pertinent part: "[a] condition barring employment shall be included in an appearance
and delivery bond in connection with a deportation proceeding . . . . Only those aliens
who upon application . . . establish compelling reasons for granting employment authorization may be authorized to accept employment."
111. 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
112. Id. at 1367. The district court opinion of December 16, 1983, is as yet unreported. See 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 400 (1985).
113. 743 F.2d at 1368.
114. Id.
115. The INS asserted that judicial review is only available through habeas corpus
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and that the case was not ripe for adjudication. 743
F.2d at 1368-69.
116. 743 F.2d at 1369-70. It is interesting to note that following the final hearing
before the district court, the INS moved for summary judgment. The court, however,
granted summary judgment to the non-moving plaintiffs. The court held that there was
no issue of material fact; the regulations at issue were invalid because they were promulgated without statutory authority. See 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 400 (1985).
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Because plaintiffs had not moved for class certification in the district court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that without nationwide
class certification, the injunction could cover only the named plaintiffs in the action. 117 It is expected that the plaintiffs will present a
motion for nationwide certification before the district court.
SANCTUARY MOVEMENT

The influx of refugees from Central America has prompted a humanitarian response among a loose network of religious congregations across the United States.1 18 These sanctuary workers have chosen to violate immigration laws in order to shelter and often
transport illegal aliens.
Proponents of the sanctuary movement argue that the aliens are
predominantly political refugees fleeing persecution in their homelands. 119 They further allege that the Reagan Administration has
politicized the asylum process. 120 For example, supporters point out
that in 1984, the INS granted fewer than three percent of Salvadoran asylum requests, while the general average was about twenty
percent.1 21 Federal authorities, on the other hand, argue that most
122
Central Americans are economic rather than political refugees.
They further argue that an adequate asylum procedure, which includes judicial review, already exists. 123 Consequently, the reaction
of the administration to the sanctuary movement has been harsh;
more than eighteen people were indicted for conspiracy to violate
immigration laws between October 1984 and April 1985.124
The sanctuary movement has given rise to a difficult tension between the individual's right to religious freedom and the government's right to enforce immigration laws. In resolving these conflicts
between religious freedom and criminal conduct, courts first require
defendants to prove their conduct was motivated by religious beliefs.125 Courts must show extreme deference in evaluating these be117. 743 F.2d at 1371-72.
118. See Helton, Second-Class Refugees, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1985, at A27, col.
2.
119.
120.
A19, col.
121.
122.
123.

See N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1985, at A20, col. 1.
See, e.g., Shapiro, Nailing Sanctuary Givers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1985, at
1.
Id.
See N.Y. Times, Mar, 28, 1985, at A20, col. 1.
See Leibowitz, El Salvadorans in the United States: The Issues of Asylum
and Extended Voluntary Departure,FED. IMMIGRATION L. REP., June 17, 1985, at 9.
124. See Helton, supra note 118.
125. See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 742 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1984);

liefs and should not attempt to interpret canon law.126 The burden
then shifts to the government to show that the restriction is essential
and also the least burdensome
method for accomplishing a compel27
ling government objective.
In the well-publicized case of United States v. Elder,128 the INS
charged Elder, a Roman Catholic church worker, with unlawfully
transporting three Salvadorans in violation of section 274(a)(2) of
the INA. 2 9 Elder was the director of a church-affiliated Texas shelter which provided assistance to Central Americans, primarily
Salvadorans. In a bench trial, the district court convicted Elder of all
three counts. In so doing, the court held, first, that the free exercise
of religion clause does not preclude prosecuting those who feel a
charitable obligation to assist those fleeing violence in other countries.1 30 Second, the court held that neither domestic nor international refugee law prohibited Elder's prosecution.' 3a
Elder satisfied his initial burden of showing that his conduct was
motivated by his religious beliefs. However, the government demonstrated an overriding interest in the protection of the congressionallysanctioned immigration system. The court noted that creating such a
system is within inherent sovereign power and necessary for the welfare and security of all Americans. 3 2 Further, the government utilized the least burdensome method for achieving its purpose.' Although Elder's actions were motivated by good will, the court
reasoned that judicial sanctioning of individual immigration policies
would result in no immigration policy at all. Furthermore, the court
rejected Elder's argument that because the Salvadorans qualified for
asylum the government could not prove the aliens were present unUnited States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
126. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 715-16 (1981).
127. See cases cited supra note 125.
128. 601 F. Supp. 1574 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1982). This section makes it a felony to transport or
harbor an alien not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to
enter or reside within the United States.
130. 601 F. Supp. at 1577-80.
131. Id. at 1580-81. Elder argued that international laws and treaties automatically entitled the aliens to receive refugee status without regard to domestic laws. The
court concluded, however, that Congress intended the Refugee Act of 1980 to fulfill its
obligations under international law, and that this act designates the Attorney General to
determine refugee status. 601 F. Supp. at 1581. Furthermore,.Congress has indicated
that the government should review applications from Salvadorans on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1581 (citing Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 731, 95 Stat. 1519 (1981)). The Elder
court also stated that the court could not interfere with political decisions made by the
United States with regard to the interpretation, enforcement, or rejection of treaty commitments which affect immigration. 601 F. Supp. at 1581.
132. 601 F. Supp. at 1578 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972));
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (The Japanese Immigrant Case).
133. 601 F. Supp. at 1580.
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lawfully, an essential element of section 274(a)(2) of the INA. The
court found that the statutory scheme requires the decision of refugee status to be made by the Attorney General, not by the courts or
individuals. 3 As of this writing, eleven sanctuary workers were being prosecuted in Tucson, Arizona on charges of smuggling, trans135
porting, and harboring aliens unlawfully in the United States.
Congress is presently considering legislation which would temporarily suspend deportation of Salvadorans currently residing in the
United States.'
DETENTION AND REPATRIATION OF CUBAN "MARIELITOS"

In the spring of 1980, approximately 125,000 Cuban nationals
came to the United States as part of the "Mariel Boatlift."'' 37 Although the Cubans, referred to as "Marielitos," were deemed excludable aliens, most were paroled into the United States and are
now being processed by the INS for permanent resident status.' 38 A
small percentage of the Marielitos, however, were denied parole and
detained, largely due to their serious criminal or mental health
records. 13 9 Most of the approximately 1800 detainees were issued final exclusion orders, but have remained in custody because of the
unwillingness of Cuba to take them back. 140 The detention of the
Marielitos has prompted extensive and complex litigation regarding
two largely independent issues, the first involving the Marielitos'
challenges to their continued detention while in the United States,
and second, their attempts to avoid repatriation to Cuba.
In Garcia-Mir v. Smith,' 4 ' the Eleventh Circuit heard a consolidated appeal by the government concerning these issues. The first
134. The Attorney General is authorized to determine an individual's refugee status. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1159 and 1253(h) (1982). See also Ramirez-Osorio v. INS, 745 F.2d
937 (5th Cir. 1984).
135. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1985, at A20, col. 1.
136. See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
137. See Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1480 (11th Cir. 1985).
138. Such permanent resident status is authorized under legislation known as the
Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (codified as amended
by § 88 of the Immigration and Nationality Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571 at
8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982)). Under this act, Cubans escaping the Castro regime were able
to adjust to permanent resident status. The INS has adopted the policy that the Cuban
Adjustment Act may still be used to adjust the status of the Marielitos. See 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES

989-91 (1984) (Questions and Answers on Cuban Adjustment Act of

1966).
139. See Garcia-Mir, 766 F.2d at 1480.
140. Id.
141. 766 F.2d 1478 (lth Cir. 1985).

issue decided by the court involved the Marielitos' challenge to their
lengthy detention. The litigation commenced in 1981 when the
filed a class action alleging their incarceration was unlawMarielitos
ful. 142 Although the district court conditionally certified the class
and began scheduling hearings on the claims,143 the court suspended
review when the Attorney General instituted a special "Status Review Plan" 144 to evaluate the necessity of the continued detention of
each class member. 145 As of December 14, 1984, 147 detainees had
been approved for release under the plan.1 46 On the same date, however, Cuba agreed to accept the return of 2746 Mariel Cubans in
exchange for the United States agreement to resume processing immigrant visas for Cuban applicants. 147 Theorizing that this repatriation agreement increased the likelihood that an alien faced with immediate deportation would abscond if released on parole, the
Attorney General directed that no Marielito be released pending
modification of the Status Review Plan.14 8
The district court rejected the Attorney General's rationale for
delayed implementation of the plan and ordered the release of detainees who had been approved for release and had obtained sponsors.1 49 The Eleventh Circuit reversed on appeal, 150 holding that the
district court erred in evaluating the decision of the Attorney General under the traditional "abuse of discretion" standard. The
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason" test adopted by the same
court in Jean v.Nelson151 was considered the proper standard of review. Utilizing this standard, the court concluded that the Attorney
General had advanced a legitimate and bona fide reason for suspen-

142. Id. at 1481.
143. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117, 123 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
144. Under the plan, a detainee is to be released if the review board determines
that: (1) the detainee is presently a nonviolent person; (2) the detainee is likely to remain
nonviolent; and (3) the detainee is unlikely to commit any criminal offenses following his
release. Garcia-Mir,766 F.2d at 1481 n.1.
145. Id. at 1481.
146. Id.
147. Press Statement by White House Press Secretary (Dec. 14, 1984), reprinted
In 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1080 (1984). As of May 24, 1985, 201 Cubans had been
returned under the agreement. See 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 483 (1985). However,
Cuba subsequently rescinded the agreement, in retaliation to United States resumption
of Radio Marti broadcasts. See id.
148. Garcia-Mir,766 F.2d at 1481.
149. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 600 F. Supp. 1500, 1506-07 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
The government, aside from the appeal presently discussed, also requested a stay of the
district court order, which the court granted on January 22, 1985. See Garcia-Mir,766
F.2d at 1481 n.2. On February 1, 1985, the Supreme Court denied the application of the
plaintiffs to vacate this stay. Garcia-Mir v.Smith, 105 S.Ct. 948, 949-50 (1985).
150. Garcia-Mir,766 F.2d at 1478.
151. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 977 (lth Cir. 1984), affid, 105 S.Ct. 2992
(1985) (en banc).

460

[VOL. 23: 441, 1986]

Significant Developments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

152
sion of the releases.
A separate issue heard by the court related to Marielito attempts
to avoid deportation to Cuba. The issue arose when two Marielitos,
Leon-Orosco and Rodriguez-Colas, amended their class-action complaint to request asylum or withholding of deportation. 15 3 The district court, however, concluded that its review power was limited to
class members who had exhausted their administrative rights-those
who had undergone both an exclusion hearing before an immigration
judge and an appeal before the BIA. r'" Meanwhile, these plaintiffs
had acquired new evidence which they believed would lend support
to their asylum and withholding claims. In order to introduce the
new evidence and still comply with the statutory exhaustion requirements, plaintiffs filed two administrative "test cases," 1 55 which both
parties stipulated to be binding on all asylum and withholding of
deportation issues relating to class members.156 After losing the "test
cases," these plaintiffs moved to reopen, alleging that they were
members of a "social group" who had a well-founded fear of persecution should they be returned to Cuba.1 57 Both motions were subsequently denied on the merits.158
Having lost their "test cases," plaintiffs returned to the district
court,1 59 alleging that the BIA had abused its discretion by denying
the motions to reopen and claiming that the district court was empowered under 8 U.S.C. § 1105(b) to grant remedial relief to the
entire class.160 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs on both
counts and ordered the BIA to set aside all outstanding exclusion
orders.1 61 The court further ordered the reopening of plaintiffs' exclusion cases for consideration of the merits of their asylum
claims. 62
The INS appealed this decision, 1 3 challenging both the procedural and substantive findings of the district court. In Garcia-Mir,
the court first considered the governmental contention that the dis-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Garcia-Mir,766 F.2d at 1485.
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 925, 931-35 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
Id. at 925.
In re Leon-Orosco and Rodriguez-Colas, Interim Dec. 2974 (BIA 1983).
See Garcia-Mir,766 F.2d at 1482.
Id. See also supra note 55.
See Garcia-Mir,766 F.2d at 1483.
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 599 F.Supp. 1103 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 1105-09.
Id.
Garcia-Mir,766 F.2d at 1478.

trict court was without jurisdiction to set aside the entire class' ex64
clusion orders prior to their making individual motions to reopen.
Noting that the exhaustion statute severely limits the power of the
federal courts to review exclusion orders, the court concluded that
the governmental stipulations in the two test cases could not be interpreted to waive the exhaustion requirements for other class members. 1 5 Furthermore, the stipulations were limited to narrow issues
and could not adequately encompass other cases which possibly involved multi-issue claims for exclusion and withholding of deportation. 66 Thus, the district court could properly exercise jurisdiction
only 16over
the two cases which were known to be administratively
7
final.
As to the merits of the claims of Leon-Orosco and Rodriguez-Colas the circuit court also reversed the district court, holding that the
BIA had applied the appropriate "well-founded fear of persecution"
standard to the asylum claims and had justifiably denied the motions
in light of the evidence.'6 8
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

In 1985, Congress again attempted to enact comprehensive immigration reform legislation. Major reform bills were introduced before
both houses of Congress. However, insufficient time remained in the
first session of the Ninety-ninth Congress for debate and
reconciliation.
On September 19, 1985, the Senate passed its bill, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1985.169 This measure is a simplified
version of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill of the previous Congress, which
failed in a joint conference committee after passing both houses.170
The goal of the bill remains the same-to control the flow of illegal
immigrants into the United States. It provides for increased funding
for INS border patrol and other inspection and enforcement activities, increased penalties for immigration-related violations,'17 and
employer sanctions for those who knowingly hire illegal aliens.
164. Id. at 1486.
165. Id. at 1486-89.
166. Id. at 1487.
167. Id. at 1489.
168. Id. at 1489-93.
169. S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Sen. Simpson).
170. S. 529, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The bill ultimately failed due to disagreement over whether or not a spending cap should be inserted to limit federal reimbursement to states for legalization costs. See Cohodas, New Immigration Bill Introduced in Senate, 43 CONG. Q. 1024, 1025 (1985).
171. For example, the bill increases the penalties for activities such as the knowing
transportation or harboring of undocumented aliens. S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1985).
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The focal point of the bill is employer sanctions.1 72 The bill makes
it unlawful for a person or other entity to knowingly hire, recruit, or
refer for consideration or employment in the United States, an alien
unauthorized to work. To defend against the charge of unlawful hir-

ing, the employer must be able to attest that he examined legitimate
documents establishing the prospective employee's eligibility to work.
If an employer of four or more employees does not follow the verification procedure and an unauthorized alien is found in his employ,
the employer will be presumed to have knowingly hired the alien.
Penalties for the first offense include administrative desist orders and
civil fines ranging from $100 to $2000 for each violation; a pattern
or practice of violation can lead to fines of $3000 to $10,000.
Another important aspect of the bill is its program to legalize the
status of long-term undocumented aliens. The bill would grant temporary legal status to illegal aliens who have been physically present
in the United States since the date of enactment and (1) have continuously resided in the United States since January 1, 1980, or (2)
are special Cuban or Haitian entrants whose residency dates from
October 14, 1981. Persons receiving temporary status would be able
to subsequently adjust to permanent status upon fulfillment of minimum requirements.1 73 Commencement of this program, however, is
made contingent upon the effectiveness of employer sanctions and
other enforcement measures. As passed by the Senate, the bill also
includes a controversial amendment" establishing a seasonal guestworker program for growers of perishable commodities.1 7
172. It is interesting to note that on July 23, 1985, the State of Louisiana enacted
an employer sanctions law which imposes civil fines on persons who knowingly hire, employ, recruit or refer for employment in the United States, aliens not entitled to reside or
work within the United States. See 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1056 (1985).
173. The bill requires minimum knowledge of English and United States history
and government, or enrollment in a program to acquire such knowledge. S. 1200, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
174. The amendment was introduced by Sen. Pete Wilson. See San Diego Union,
Dec. 15, 1985, at A8, col. 2.
175. The guest-worker program would provide for the admittance of up to 350,000
workers at a time, to work for up to nine months a year, in specific regions of the United
States. The program would end after three years, unless Congress and the White House
agree to its extension. See San Diego Union, Oct. 1, 1985, at Al, col. 1. On September
30, 1985, the Reagan Administration proposed its own version of a guestworker program.
The plan is primarily intended to benefit western growers of perishable crops. The growers have traditionally relied on illegal aliens to harvest the crops. The program would
allow non-resident aliens to enter the United States and work for growers of perishable
crops for specified periods of time. The details of the program, such as its size and duration, would be determined by Congress. See San Diego Union, Oct. 1, 1985, at Al, col.
1; see also 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 866-67, 896-97 (1985) (review of bills proposed

The House Immigration Subcommittee opened hearings on the
Immigration Control and Legalization Amendments Act of 1985.178
Similar to the Senate measure, the House bill proposes employer
sanctions and improved enforcement activities to control illegal immigration, a legalization program for undocumented aliens residing
in the United States since January 1, 1982, and a special procedure
for the admission of temporary agricultural workers.' 77 Attempted
reconciliation of the House and Senate bills will most likely take
place in 1986 when the second session of the Ninety-ninth Congress
commences.
The United States does not presently grant special immigration
benefits to Salvadorans as a group. Identical bills have been introduced before both houses of Congress to temporarily suspend the deportation of those Salvadorans who currently reside in the United
States. 17 81 No Salvadoran would be deported pending a government
study regarding: (1) the number and condition of displaced persons
in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico; (2) the fate of
those persons returned to El Salvador from the United States
whether through deportation or otherwise; and (3) the conditions in
El Salvador as compared with those in other countries in which their
nationals have been granted extended voluntary departure. Proponents of the measure argue that extended voluntary departure is
mandated by the widespread violence in El Salvador, coupled with
the inability of the El Salvadoran government to provide basic protection to its citizens. 17 9 Supporters of the bill are critical of the Reagan Administration's practice of approving only a small percentage
of Salvadoran asylum requests. 180 The Reagan Administration opposes the bill and denies allegations that a conspiracy to deny Salvadoran asylum requests exists. 18 ' Other opponents of the bill contend
that violence has dramatically decreased in El Salvador, obviating
the need for congressional action. They further assert that the bill
would undermine the existing asylum system and increase the flow of
and of enacted amendments).
176. H.R. 3080, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Reps. Rodino &
Mazzoli).
177. Another immigration bill, the Immigration Reform Act of 1985, H.R. 2180,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), was introduced before the House on April 23, 1985, by
Edward R. Roybal. Also concerned with the rate of illegal immigration, the bill proposes
enhanced law enforcement mechanisms rather than employer sanctions. Additionally, the
Roybal bill provides for a one-tier legalization program with an eligibility date of January 1, 1982. The Immigration Reform Act of 1985 further provides for a system of
protections for aliens who seek legalization, and the establishment of commissions and
programs to resolve the underlying causes of illegal immigration.
178. S. 377, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 822, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
179. See Cohodas, Status of Salvadorans Debated on Capitol Hill, 43 CONG. Q.
787, 787-88 (1985).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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illegal immigration.
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CONCLUSION

In 1985 Congress and the courts focused much attention on perceived crises involving immigration issues. For example, federal
courts examined the legality of the growing sanctuary movement and
the fate of the Cuban "Marielitos" still incarcerated in the United
States. Congress considered the necessity of imposing employer sanctions to control the ever-increasing flow of illegal immigrants into the
United States, and the possibility of extending special immigration
benefits to El Salvadorans presently residing in the United States.
The Supreme Court was considerably less active in the field of
immigration than in recent years. The two cases decided by the
Court in 1985 presented issues concerning eligibility for suspension
of deportation and the detention and denial of parole to refugees.
Lower federal courts continued to disagree over the standards of
proof which must be met by persons seeking asylum or withholding
of deportation relief. Additionally, federal courts evaluated the legality of certain INS search practices in the context of the fourth
amendment. The increasing rate of illegal immigration suggests that
judicial activism will increase in this field in the coming years, as
United States immigration law and policy struggle to keep up with
the latest "wave of immigration" in this country.
DIANE H. SPARROW
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